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Nothing is Sacred: 
Why Georgia and California Cannot Bar 
Contractual Jury Waivers in Federal Court 
Brian S. Thomley* 
INTRODUCTION 
Federal courts have long recognized that the right to a civil jury trial 
may be waived in advance by private agreement.1  But contractual jury 
waivers are now unenforceable under Georgia and California law.2  No one 
has explored whether the Erie doctrine requires federal courts exercising 
diversity jurisdiction in Georgia and California to bar these waivers under 
Georgia or California law.  This Comment proposes that federal courts 
must continue to enforce these waivers under federal law. 
Part I compares federal law on contractual jury waivers with the laws 
of the states.  While federal statutes do not expressly allow these waivers, 
federal courts enforce them because the U.S. Supreme Court and the 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) have endosed similar pre-dispute 
agreements.3  Georgia and California courts, unlike the courts of other 
states, bar these waivers because they are not expressly allowed by statute.  
But  these  states’  legislatures do not necessarily prohibit these waivers. 
Part II compares federal interests in enforcing contractual jury waivers 
with  Georgia’s   and  California’s   interests   in  barring   them.     Federal courts 
have an interest in upholding agreements that reduce the expense and delay 
of litigation for parties and courts.  Georgia and California, however, have 
an interest in preventing parties from unfairly bargaining away the 
constitutional right to a jury trial. 
Part III traces the U.S.   Supreme   Court’s   development of the 
constitutional doctrine from Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,4 which 
provides that federal courts sitting in diversity must  apply  the  ‘substantive’  
 
* J.D. Candidate 2009, Chapman University School of Law.  I wish to thank Professor Henry 
Noyes for the idea for this Comment and Professors Nhan Vu and Lisa Litwiller for their invaluable 
direction and insight.  I dedicate this Comment to my ever loving and supportive wife, Christi. 
 1 See Debra T. Landis, Contractual Jury Trial Waivers in Federal Civil Cases, 92 A.L.R. FED. 
688, 691 (1989); Jay M. Zitter, Contractual Jury Trial Waivers in State Civil Cases, 42 A.L.R.5TH 53, 
53 (1996). 
 2 Bank S., N.A. v. Howard, 444 S.E.2d 799, 800 (Ga. 1994); Grafton Partners, L.P. v. Superior 
Court, 116 P.3d 479, 492 (Cal. 2005). 
 3 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2000). 
 4 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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law of the state.  As  for  state  ‘procedural’ rules, two alternative tests have 
evolved.  The   ‘guided’   Erie test generally requires the application of a 
federal statute or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that covers the issue.  If 
no federal statute or Rule applies, the   ‘unguided’   Erie test requires the 
application of state law if applying federal law would substantially affect 
the outcome of litigation, unless there are countervailing federal interests. 
Part IV proposes that the Erie doctrine requires federal courts to 
continue to enforce contractual jury waivers under federal law.  The Erie 
doctrine applies because there is a conflict between federal and state law.  
In Simler v. Conner, the U.S. Supreme Court commanded that federal law 
govern the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.  Alternatively, this part 
proposes that the FAA would control, because it satisfies both prongs of a 
‘guided’  Erie test.  First, the FAA is broad enough to cover the issue by 
making arbitration agreements enforceable, because contractual jury 
waivers are implicit parts of such agreements.  Second, the FAA is a valid 
exercise of Congress’  constitutional  power  to  regulate  procedure. 
Alternatively, Part IV proposes that federal common law would 
control under an ‘unguided’  Erie test.  Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s  
Erie jurisprudence, the ‘knowing  and  voluntary’  standard  satisfies  the three 
prongs of this test.  First, whether a judge or jury decides a dispute is a 
matter of procedure.  Second, applying federal law would not substantially 
affect the outcome of litigation.  Third, even if the application of federal 
law were outcome-determinative, federal interests in enforcing agreements 
that make litigation more efficient outweigh Georgia’s   and   California’s 
interests in protecting the right to a jury. 
I.  COMPARISON OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAW ON CONTRACTUAL 
JURY WAIVERS 
A. The Federal Constitution and Statutes Allow Contractual Jury Waivers 
The Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that, in 
civil cases in federal courts, “the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”5  
This provision says nothing about whether it may be waived.  But the U.S. 
Supreme Court, in Bank of Columbia v. Okely, said that this provision 
requires federal courts to preserve the right to a jury, not the jury itself; and 
“the   benefit   of   [this right] may, therefore,   be   relinquished.”6  Thus, the 
Seventh Amendment right to a jury may be waived. 
Congress has expressly recognized that parties may also waive their 
rights to a jury during litigation.  An 1865 act recognized waiver by written 
stipulation to the clerk of court.7  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
promulgated by the U.S. Supreme Court pursuant to legislative authority, 
 
 5 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 6 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819). 
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incorporate the 1865 act by recognizing waiver by express stipulation.8  
The Rules also allow waiver by failure to file a timely request for a jury 
trial or by raising equitable issues that are not entitled to a jury trial.9 
Parties may also waive their rights to a jury prior to litigation.  In 
1925, the FAA made arbitration agreements as enforceable as any other 
contract.10  Parties that agree to submit their dispute to an arbitrator 
necessarily waive their rights in advance to submit that dispute to a jury.11  
One may argue that the right to a jury only attaches once the parties have 
submitted their dispute to a court of law.  But the legislative history of the 
FAA suggests that an arbitration agreement implicates the right to a jury by 
stating that “[t]he   constitutional   right   to   a   jury   trial   is   adequately 
safeguarded” in such agreements.12 
Congress has not expressly recognized pre-litigation jury waivers 
outside of arbitration agreements.  But the U.S. Supreme Court commands 
federal  courts  to  uphold  parties’  rights  to  enter  into  pre-dispute agreements 
that do not clearly violate law or public policy.13  Thus, federal courts must 
enforce valid contractual jury waivers unless Congress has expressly stated 
or necessarily implied that they violate law or public policy. 
Congress has never expressly stated or necessarily implied that 
contractual jury waivers are contrary to law.  In Kearney v. Case, the U.S. 
Supreme Court interpreted the 1865 act that allowed jury trial waiver by 
written stipulation to the clerk of court.14  The Court observed that the 
statute was ambiguous as to whether it excluded other methods of waiver.15  
The Court concluded that, “both by express agreement in open court, and 
by implied consent, the right to a jury trial could be waived.”16  Thus, the 
Court affirmed a decision in which it had allowed waiver by private 
agreement in advance of litigation.17  The FAA, likewise, does not indicate 
that arbitration is the only method of waiving the jury prior to litigation. 
Also, contractual jury waivers are not contrary to public policy.  
Rather, the FAA declares a strong public policy favoring them.  A primary 
purpose of the FAA was to support agreements that reduce the expense and 
 
 7 Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 86, § 4, 13 Stat. 501 (current version at FED. R. CIV. P. 39). 
 8 FED. R. CIV. P. 39(a) (2008). 
 9 Id. 38(d), 39(a). 
 10 United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2000)). 
 11 E.g., L & R Realty  v.  Conn.  Nat’l  Bank,  715  A.2d  748,  753  (Conn.  1998)  (“[J]ury  trial  waivers  
entered into in advance of litigation are similar to arbitration agreements in that both involve the 
relinquishment  of  the  right  to  have  a  jury  decide  the  facts  of  the  case.”). 
 12 S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 3 (1924) (emphasis added). 
 13 See infra Part I.B. 
 14 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 275, 282 (1871). 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 281 (citing Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235 (1819)). 
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delay of litigation.18  Contractual jury waivers are implicit parts of 
arbitration agreements and serve the same interests.19  Also, an arbitration 
agreement  “involves  a  greater  compromise  of  procedural protections”  than  
a contractual jury waiver.20  Thus, “[p]ublic policy that permits parties to 
waive trial altogether surely does not forbid waiver of trial by jury.”21 
B.  The U.S. Supreme Court Allows Contractual Jury Waivers 
In 1819, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 
enforced a contractual jury waiver.22  In Okely, the defendant made a note 
negotiable at a bank whose charter provided for collection of debts by a 
summary proceeding without a jury.23  The trial court held that this waiver 
was void under the Seventh Amendment.24  The U.S. Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that the waiver was valid and enforceable.25  The Court 
reasoned that  the  defendant,  “in consideration of the credit given him . . . 
voluntarily relinquished his claims to the ordinary administration of 
justice”  by his “submission  to  the  law  of  the  contract.”26 
In 1871, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Okely in Kearney v. Case.27  
Thus, consistent with the  Court’s  view that courts must enforce agreements 
that do not clearly violate law or public policy,28 pre-dispute agreements 
are enforceable under federal law unless Congress has expressly stated or 
necessarily implied that they are prohibited. 
In 1874, the U.S. Supreme Court retreated from this view.  In Home 
Insurance Co. v. Morse, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld, under 
 
 18 See infra Part II.A. 
 19 See id. 
 20 See Telum, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton Credit Corp., 859 F.2d 835, 838 (10th Cir. 1988). 
 21 In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 132 (Tex. 2004).  The Texas Supreme Court 
explained why jury waivers are preferable to arbitration agreements: 
By agreeing to arbitration, parties waive not only their right to trial by jury but their right to 
appeal, whereas by agreeing to waive only the former right, they take advantage of the 
reduced expense and delay of a bench trial, avoid the expense of arbitration, and retain their 
right to appeal.  The parties obtain dispute resolution of their own choosing in a manner 
already afforded to litigants in their courts.  Their rights, and the orderly development of 
the law, are further protected by appeal.  And even if the option appeals only to a few, 
some of the tide away from the civil justice system to alternate dispute resolution is 
stemmed. 
Id. 
 22 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235 (1819), construed in Rodenbur v. Kaufman, 320 F.2d 679, 684 (D.C. 
Cir.  1963)  (“[P]arties,  at   least  in  situations where summary procedure is clearly to be desired, may in 
advance  contract  to  waive  a  trial  by  jury.”),  and Smith-Johnson Motor Corp. v. Hoffman Motors Corp., 
411 F. Supp. 670, 676–77  (E.D.  Va.  1975)  (“It  seems  clear  that  contractual  provisions  waiving  trial by 
jury in civil actions are neither illegal nor contrary  to  public  policy.”). 
 23 Id. at 241. 
 24 Id. at 237–38. 
 25 Id. at 246. 
 26 Id. at 243. 
 27 See supra note 17. 
 28 See Baltimore & Oh. Sw. Ry. Co. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498, 505 (1900). 
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Okely, an agreement adopted pursuant to a state statute that waived a 
foreign  insurance  company’s  rights  to  remove  a   lawsuit to federal court.29  
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the agreement was “illegal 
and  void.”30  The Court added, in dicta:  “There  is  no  sound  principle  upon  
which [arbitration agreements and contractual jury waivers] can be 
specifically  enforced.”31  The Court explained: 
A man may not barter away his life or his freedom, or his substantial rights. . . . 
In a civil case he may submit his particular suit by his own consent to an 
arbitration, or to the decision of a single judge.  So he may omit to exercise his 
right to remove his suit to a Federal tribunal, as often as he thinks fit, in each 
recurring case.  In these aspects any citizen may no doubt waive the rights to 
which he may be entitled.  He cannot, however, bind himself in advance by an 
agreement, which may be specifically enforced, thus to forfeit his rights at all 
times and on all occasions, whenever the case may be presented.32 
Under the reasoning of Morse, the rules of dispute resolution are fixed 
by Congress and federal courts have no power to allow parties to alter them 
by private agreement in advance of litigation.33  Thus, pre-dispute 
agreements were considered illegal and against public policy unless 
expressly authorized by statute. 
The Court upheld Morse into the early twentieth century.34  The Court 
did not embrace arbitration agreements until Congress made them 
enforceable in 1925.35  Congress intended the FAA to reverse courts’  
refusals to enforce such agreements.36  Congress also intended that such 
agreements were to be as enforceable as any other contract.37  Thus, the 
Court has since enforced them if valid under ordinary contract law.38 
In the late twentieth century, however, the Court rejected Morse by 
enforcing pre-dispute agreements without legislative authority.39  In 
National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, the Court enforced an 
agreement to appoint an agent for service of process under ordinary 
 
 29 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 447, 457 (1874), abrogated in Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 
U.S. 1 (1972). 
 30 Id. at 451, 458. 
 31 Id. at 450. 
 32 Id. at 451. 
 33 David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted Confluence of 
Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085, 
1093 (2002). 
 34 Id. at 1094–95. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995). 
 37 Id. at 271; 9 U.S.C. § 2   (2000)   (“A   written provision . . . to settle by arbitration a 
controversy . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation  of  any  contract.”). 
 38 See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual 
Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 170–72 (2004). 
 39 Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 33, at 1095. 
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principles of agency.40  In Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., the Court held 
that a forum selection clause was presumptively enforceable if valid under 
contract law.41  The Court in Bremen renounced a broad reading of Morse 
and explained that such clauses should be enforceable because they 
encourage freedom of contract and stimulate trade and commerce.42 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not squarely held that contractual jury 
waivers are enforceable.  But Szukhent and Bremen have abrogated the 
view in Morse that these waivers are contrary to law and public policy.  
These decisions also herald a modern era in which parties have virtually 
unlimited rights to control their disputes.  G. Richard Shell argues that “the 
modern Court has shown more fidelity to an absolute principle of freedom 
to contract than  the  Courts  that  preceded  it.”43 
C. Federal Courts Enforce Contractual Jury Waivers if they were 
‘Knowing and Voluntary’ 
In the late twentieth century, the lower federal courts began to enforce 
contractual jury waivers.44  Federal   courts   recognize   that   “contractual  
provisions waiving trial by jury in civil actions are neither illegal nor 
contrary   to  public  policy.”45  These courts analogize to the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s   liberal enforcement of contractual jury waivers and other pre-
dispute agreements in Okely, Szukhent and Bremen.46 
Federal courts enforce most pre-dispute agreements under state 
contract law.47  But the U.S. Supreme Court commands that federal law 
apply to contractual jury waivers.  In Simler v. Conner, the federal court of 
appeals in a diversity action denied   the   plaintiff’s   request   for   a   jury   trial  
because state law characterized his claims for relief as equitable.48  The 
U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that federal law controlled the 
characterization of his claims.49  The Court commanded that  “the right to a 
jury trial in the federal courts is to be determined as a matter of federal 
law.”50  The Court explained that “[o]nly through a holding that the jury 
trial right is to be determined according to federal law can the uniformity in 
 
 40 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964). 
 41 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2008). 
 42 Id. at 9–10 & n.10. 
 43 G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 433, 433 (1993).  
See generally id. at 452–62  (discussing  the  Court’s  presumptive enforcement of pre-dispute agreements 
under cases such as Szukhent and Bremen). 
 44 See Landis, supra note 1, at 691. 
 45 E.g., Smith-Johnson Motor Corp. v. Hoffman Motors Corp., 411 F. Supp. 670, 677 (E.D. Va. 
1975). 
 46 See, e.g., id. at 675–77. 
 47 See Ware, supra note 38, at 181–97. 
 48 372 U.S. 221, 221 (1963). 
 49 Id. at 222. 
 50 Id. 
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its exercise which is demanded by the Seventh Amendment be achieved.”51 
In a criminal case, “[w]aivers of constitutional rights not only must be 
voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient 
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”52  In 
D.H. Overmyer Co. of Ohio v. Frick Co., the U.S. Supreme Court enforced 
a waiver of due process rights to notice and a hearing in a civil case 
because  it  was  “voluntary, knowing, and intelligently made.”53  Thus, after 
Overmyer, federal  courts  “have  overwhelmingly  applied   the knowing and 
voluntary standard” to determine whether the Seventh Amendment may be 
waived.54  This standard is a constitutional one that is separate from, and 
higher than, contract law.55 
To determine whether a waiver was ‘knowing  and  voluntary,’ a court 
examines (1) whether the waiver was conspicuous, (2) whether it was 
negotiable, (3) the relative sophistication of the parties, and (4) their 
relative bargaining power.56  The circuits are split as to which party has the 
burden of proving whether a contractual jury waiver was knowing and 
voluntary.57  Most circuits place the burden on the party seeking to enforce 
the waiver because, “as  the  right  of  jury  trial  is  fundamental, courts indulge 
every reasonable presumption against waiver.”58  The Sixth Circuit places 
the burden on the party seeking to avoid the waiver, applying a 
“presumption  in  favor  of  validity  in  the  interest  of  liberty  of  contract.”59 
D. The Courts of Most States Enforce Contractual Jury Waivers 
States are not required to provide the right to a civil jury trial, because 
the Seventh Amendment has not been incorporated into the Fourteenth 
Amendment and applied to the states.60  Nevertheless, every state provides 
for the right, either by constitution or statute.61 
 
 51 Id. 
 52 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). 
 53 See 405 U.S. 174, 185–86 (1972). 
 54 K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 756 (6th Cir. 1985).  Scholars disagree as to the 
appropriate standard applicable to such waivers.  E.g., compare Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding 
Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 669 (2000) (knowing and voluntary) with Ware, supra note 38 (contract law). 
 55 See K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 755–56 (citing Overmyer, 405 U.S. at 183). 
 56 RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d 811, 813–14 (N.D. Tex. 2002).  See generally 
Sternlight, supra note 54, at 677–95 (2000) (discussing how courts apply the factors under the knowing 
and voluntary standard). 
 57 Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 813.  See generally Joel Andersen, The Indulgence of Reasonable 
Presumptions:  Federal Court Contractual Civil Jury Trial Waivers, 102 MICH. L. REV. 104 (2003). 
 58 E.g., Nat’l  Equip.  Rental,  Ltd.  v.  Hendrix,  565  F.2d  255,  258   (2d  Cir.  1977)   (quoting Aetna 
Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937)). 
 59 K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 758 (quoting 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE 
¶ 38.46, at 38-400 (2d ed. 1984)). 
 60 See Minn. & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916). 
 61 Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 812 n.4. 
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In the nineteenth century, state courts, like the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Morse, did not enforce contractual jury waivers unless authorized by 
statute.  For example, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in Nute v. 
Hamilton Mutual Insurance Co., held that a forum selection clause in an 
insurance policy was unenforceable as a matter of law.62  The court said, in 
dicta, that the right to a jury may not be waived by private agreement.63  
The court reasoned that the legislature cannot delegate to courts and parties 
the power to alter the rules of dispute resolution because they “affect   the  
remedy,  and  are  created  and  regulated  by  law.”64  The court also said that 
private agreements that alter these rules in advance were against public 
policy by interfering with the convenience of having uniform rules.65 
In the twentieth century, however, state courts rejected the view in 
Nute and began to enforce contractual jury waivers without legislative 
authority.66  As one court stated, these waivers   serve   the   “public   policy  
favoring   freedom   of   contract   and   the   efficient   resolution   of   disputes.”67  
The states apply different standards to these waivers.  Some states enforce 
them under contract law, while others apply the knowing and voluntary 
standard.68  Contractual jury waivers are unenforceable in Montana by 
statute and in Oklahoma by constitutional provision.69  Georgia and 
California have barred them by judicial decision.70 
E. The Georgia and California Supreme Courts Bar Contractual Jury 
Waivers 
1. Bank South, N.A. v. Howard 
In 1994, the Georgia Supreme Court barred contractual jury waivers.  
In Bank South, N.A. v. Howard, a bank lender suing a guarantor on a debt 
sought to enforce a jury waiver provision in the guaranty.71  The trial court 
struck   the   guarantor’s   request   for   a   jury   trial.72  The court of appeals 
 
 62 See 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 174, 176, 185 (1856), abrogated by W.R. Grace & Co. v. Hartford 
Accident & Indem. Co., 555 N.E.2d 214 (Mass. 1990). 
 63 Id. at 181. 
 64 See id. at 180. 
 65 Id. at 184. 
 66 See Zitter, supra note 1. 
 67 L & R Realty v.  Conn.  Nat’l  Bank,  715  A.2d 748, 753 (Conn. 1998). 
 68 E.g., compare id. at 755 (applying ordinary contract law) with In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 
148 S.W.3d 124, 134 (Tex. 2004) (applying the knowing and voluntary standard). 
 69 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-708 (2007)   (“Every stipulation or condition in a contract by 
which any party thereto is restricted from enforcing his rights under the contract by the usual 
proceedings in the ordinary tribunals or which limits the time within which he may thus enforce his 
rights is void.”);; OKLA. CONST.  art.  XXIII,  §  8  (“Any  provision  of  a  contract,  express  or  implied,  made  
by any person, by which any of the benefits of this Constitution is sought to be waived, shall be null and 
void.”). 
 70 See Grafton Partners, L.P. v. Superior Court, 116 P.3d 479, 493 (Cal. 2005) (Chin, J., 
concurring). 
 71 Bank S., N.A. v. Howard, 444 S.E.2d 799, 799 (Ga. 1994). 
 72 Id. 
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reversed, holding that the waiver was unenforceable because it was not 
knowing and voluntary.73  The Georgia Supreme Court, affirming, ruled 
that contractual jury waivers are unenforceable.74 
Article I, section 1 of the Georgia Constitution provides:    “The right to 
trial by jury shall remain inviolate, except that the court shall render 
judgment without the verdict of a jury in all civil cases where no issuable 
defense is filed and where a jury is not demanded in writing by either 
party.”75  A Georgia statute allows waiver by oral or written stipulation to 
the court.76  The Bank South court stated that,   “[b]y   their   terms,  both the 
statute and the Constitution plainly contemplate the pendency of litigation 
at the time of the waiver.”77  Thus, methods of waiver expressly authorized 
by the legislature are exclusive.78  The court distinguished contractual jury 
waivers from arbitration agreements because the latter were expressly 
authorized by statute.79  The court compared contractual jury waivers to 
confessions of judgment, noting that the latter are only allowed during 
pending litigation.80  The court also observed  “the  magnitude of the rights 
involved and the probability of abuse that exists in both situations.”81 
Justice Sears-Collins, dissenting, argued that contractual jury waivers 
should be enforceable.82  She noted that the constitutional and statutory 
provisions  “do not provide that their methods by which the right to a jury 
trial can be waived are exclusive.”83  She argued that any ambiguity should 
be resolved in favor of enforceability, because parties may enter into 
agreements unless the legislature expresses or necessarily implies that the 
agreement violates law or public policy.84  She pointed out that these 
waivers “economize   litigation   for   the   parties   and   for   an   already  
overburdened court system.”85  She also argued that the parties that use 
these clauses are sophisticated enough to understand their consequences.86  
She criticized the  majority’s  analogy  to a confession of judgment, because 
jury waivers forfeit only the right to a jury, but the  latter  “forfeits  a  panoply  
of constitutional and statutory rights, including the right to any trial 
whatsoever.”87  Bank South has generated much criticism.88 
 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 800. 
 75 GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ XI. 
 76 GA. STAT. § 9-11-39(a) (2008). 
 77 Bank South, 444 S.E.2d at 800. 
 78 See id. 
 79 Id. at n.5. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at 801 (Sears-Collins, J., dissenting). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 See RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d 811, 812 n.4 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (collecting 
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2.  Grafton Partners, L.P. v. Superior Court 
In 2005, the California Supreme Court followed the Georgia Supreme 
Court and barred contractual jury waivers.  In Grafton Partners, L.P. v. 
Superior Court, a partnership sued the accounting firm, Price 
WaterhouseCoopers, L.L.P., for misrepresentation and other causes of 
action after the partnership hired the firm to audit its accounts.89  The trial 
court enforced a jury waiver provision in the retainer agreement.90  The 
California Supreme Court, however, affirmed   the  court  of  appeal’s ruling 
that contractual jury waivers are unenforceable.91 
Article I, section 16 of the California Constitution provides:  “Trial by 
jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all . . . . In a civil cause a 
jury may be waived by the consent of the parties expressed as prescribed 
by statute.”92  The corresponding provision in the 1849 constitution read:  
“[A] jury trial may be waived by the parties in all civil cases in the manner 
to be prescribed by law.”93  In Exline v. Smith, the California Supreme 
Court found that, under this provision only the legislature could determine 
how a jury may be waived.94  Exline invalidated an 1851 statute that 
allowed California courts to prescribe their own methods.95  The Exline 
court pontificated that,   “[t]he   right   of   trial   by   jury   is   too   sacred   in   its  
character to be frittered away or committed to the uncontrolled caprice of 
every  judge  or  magistrate  in  the  State.”96 
In Grafton, the California Supreme Court found that the present 
constitution supported Exline’s   interpretation   of   the   former   one.97  The 
constitutional convention of 1878-1879 considered proposals that deleted 
the   “prescribed   by   law”   language and simply allowed parties to waive a 
trial by jury.98  These proposals were voted down without explanation.99  
The Grafton court reasoned that the convention, by reenacting this phrase 
in substantially similar language, incorporated Exline’s   interpretation.100  
Thus, the court concluded, the California Constitution provides that only 
the legislature may determine how a jury may be waived.101 
 
sources). 
 89 Grafton Partners, L.P. v. Superior Court, 116 P.3d 479, 479 (Cal. 2005). 
 90 Id. at 481. 
 91 Id. at 492. 
 92 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16 (emphasis added). 
 93 CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 3 (emphasis added). 
 94 5 Cal. 112, 112–13 (1855). 
 95 Id. at 112 (citing California Civil Practice Act, ch. 5, § 179, Stat. 1851, 78). 
 96 Id. at 113. 
 97 Grafton Partners, L.P. v. Superior Court, 116 P.3d 479, 483 (Cal. 2005). 
 98 1 E.B. WILLIS & P.K. STOCKTON, DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 1878–1879, 253, 255, 303–05 (1880–1881).  The 
members  lauded  these  proposals  as  “safe  for   the  ends  of   justice  and  the  preservation of private rights 
and  the  public  interest”  and  a  way  of  reducing  expensive  jury  trials.    See id. 
 99 See id. 
 100 Grafton, 116 P.3d at 479. 
 101 Id. at 482. 
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The court found that Code of Civil Procedure section 631 supported 
this conclusion.102  The  statute  reads:     “In  civil  cases,  a   jury  may  only be 
waived”  in  six  specified  ways,  all of which occur during litigation.103  The 
court  conceded  that  the  statute  was  “ambiguous  concerning  the  validity  of  
waivers  entered  into  prior  to  the  emergence  of  a  legal  dispute.”104  But the 
court interpreted the statute strictly to preserve the right to a jury trial.105  
The court opined that this provision “strongly suggests that waiver of the 
right to jury trial must occur subsequent to the initiation of a civil 
lawsuit.”106  Thus, the court concluded, “it is for the Legislature, not this 
court, to determine whether, and under what circumstances, a pre-dispute 
waiver of jury trial will be enforceable in this state.”107 
The court conceded that contractual jury waivers support public 
policies by conserving judicial resources and promoting freedom of 
contract.108  The court also acknowledged that other states offer 
extraordinary protections for the right to a jury.109  But the court was 
“reluctant”  to  substitute  its  own  judgment  for  the  legislature’s  as  to  whether  
and in what circumstances these waivers should be enforceable.110  The 
court defended the legislature’s decision to allow arbitration agreements 
but to bar express jury waivers.111  The court explained that public policy 
supports preserving jury trials only once litigation has begun.112  The court 
also suggested that arbitration agreements conserve more judicial 
resources.113  The court blithely dismissed the idea that its decision would 
increase the number of arbitrations or jury trials.114 
Justice Chin, concurring “reluctantly,” urged the California 
Legislature to make contractual jury waivers enforceable.115  He found 
“little  sense”  for the legislature to allow waiver by arbitration agreements 
but to bar contractual waivers.116  The majority’s   decision   “should   not  
sound  the  death  knell”  for  these  waivers  because,  “[w]hile  the  public  policy  
favoring jury trials subjects jury waiver agreements to strict construction, 
the application of that policy will not void every such agreement.”117  He 
observed that other states enforce these waivers because there   is   “no  
 
 102 Id. at 485. 
 103 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 631(a) & (d) (West 2008) (emphasis added). 
 104 Grafton, 116 P.3d at 486. 
 105 Id. at 485. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 492. 
 108 Id. at 490–91. 
 109 Id. at 491. 
 110 Id. at 491–92. 
 111 Id. at 490. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 493 (Chin, J., concurring). 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
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abstract public policy against [them].”118  He noted that these waivers are 
an   “attractive   middle   ground”   between   a   jury   trial   and   arbitration   by  
minimizing excessive jury awards while better   protecting   the   parties’  
rights.119  Grafton has, like Bank South, generated much criticism.120 
F. The Georgia and California Constitutions and Statutes do not 
Necessarily Prohibit Contractual Jury Waivers 
The U.S. Supreme Court set forth the principle, which Justice Sears-
Collins recognized in her dissent in Bank South, that pre-dispute 
agreements are enforceable unless they clearly violate law or public 
policy.121  Thus, contractual jury waivers are enforceable in Georgia and 
California unless the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions clearly 
express or necessarily imply otherwise.  Any ambiguity must be interpreted 
in favor of enforceability to uphold freedom of contract. 
The Georgia constitutional and statutory provisions merely state 
methods to waive a jury.  Thus, these provisions do not expressly state or 
necessarily imply that they prescribe the only methods. 
The California constitutional provision states that a jury may be 
waived as provided by statute.  This provision, however, does not mean 
that a jury may only be waived by statute.  Similarly, a provision of the 
Texas Constitution reads:  “The  Legislature  shall pass such laws as may be 
needed  to  regulate  [the  right  to  a  jury].”122  But the Texas Supreme Court, 
In re Prudential Insurance Co. of America held that a contractual jury trial 
waiver was enforceable because “[n]othing  in  the  constitutional  provisions  
themselves suggests that parties are powerless to waive trial by jury under 
any  other  circumstances,  before  or  after  suit  is  filed.”123 
California’s constitutional history does not clearly indicate that the 
means of waiver are reserved to the legislature alone.  The earlier 
constitutional provision did not expressly state or necessarily imply that a 
jury may only be waived as “prescribed by law.”  The debates shed no light 
on whether the framers rejected proposals to delete this language to reserve 
the methods of waiver to the legislature or whether they intended to 
incorporate the rule from Exline.  At best, this history merely suggests that 
only the California Legislature may determine methods of waiver. 
 
 118 Id. at 493–94 (quoting Okura & Co. v. Careau Group, 783 F. Supp. 482, 488 (C.D. Cal. 1991)). 
 119 Id. at 493 (internal quotations omitted). 
 120 Julia B. Strickland & Stephen J. Newman, Shock Waives, 29 LOS ANGELES LAWYER, Mar. 
2006, at 22 (arguing   that   Grafton   is   a   “paternalistic”   decision   that   will   reduce   certainty   in   the  
marketplace); Carl Grumer & Thomas McMorrow, A Call for Contractual Jury Waivers in California, 
28 LOS ANGELES LAWYER, Dec. 2005, at 44 (arguing that Justice   Chin’s   call   “deserves strong and 
widespread support”  because  Grafton will  harm  the  state’s  economy  by  increasing litigation costs). 
 121 See supra Part I.B. 
 122 TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15. 
 123 148 S.W.3d 124, 130 (Tex. 2004). 
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California Code of Civil Procedure section 631, while stating that a 
jury   may   be   waived   “only”   as   provided   therein, is inapplicable to 
contractual jury waivers.  In Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, the 
California Supreme Court found arbitration agreements enforceable under 
this  provision  because  it  “presupposes  a  pending  action”  and  thus  does  not  
apply to pre-dispute jury trial waivers.124  In Grafton, the court clarified 
that Section 631 applies only once parties have submitted their dispute to a 
court of law.125  Thus, because other statutes have not made arbitration the 
only method of pre-dispute waiver, contractual jury waivers are 
enforceable, despite this provision. 
The Georgia and California supreme courts, unlike the U.S. Supreme 
Court, saw legislative ambiguity as a complete bar on contractual jury 
waivers.  This drastic approach harks back to the outmoded views in Morse 
and Nute rather than a sensible, modern view of pre-dispute agreements.  
As the dissents in Bank South and Grafton pointed out, public policy that 
supports arbitration agreements surely supports contractual jury waivers.  
Further, as Justice Chin argued in Grafton, Georgia and California may 
protect the right to a jury by applying strict standards of waiver. 
II.  COMPARISON OF FEDERAL INTERESTS WITH GEORGIA’S AND 
CALIFORNIA’S INTERESTS 
A. Federal Courts have an Interest in Enforcing Agreements that Reduce 
the Expense and Delay of Litigation 
Federal courts have a paramount interest in enforcing private 
agreements.  Congress has declared a strong public policy in favor of 
freedom of contract, reflected in the primary purpose of the FAA, “to  
enforce private agreements into which parties had entered, a concern which 
requires that [federal courts] rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate.”126  
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that freedom of contract is a  “sacred”  
liberty of the citizen and it is “paramount”  that  courts  take  care  “not lightly 
to interfere with [it].”127  The Court also said that the “usual   and   most  
important function of courts”   is to protect   the   parties’   legitimate  
expectations where the agreement does not violate law or public policy.128 
Federal courts have an even stronger interest in promoting freedom to 
enter into agreements that resolve disputes efficiently.  Federal procedure is 
designed   “to   secure   the   just,   speedy, and inexpensive determination of 
 
 124 552 P.2d 1178, 1186–87 (Cal. 1976). 
 125 Grafton Partners, L.P. v. Superior Court, 116 P.3d 479, 486 (Cal. 2005). 
 126 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625–26 (1985) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 127 Baltimore & Oh. Sw. Ry. Co. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498, 505 (1900) (internal quotations omitted). 
 128 See id. (internal quotations omitted). 
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every  action.”129  Congress supported arbitration agreements because they 
save the time and expense of litigating in a judicial forum.130  Jury trials 
cost much more for courts and litigants than bench trials.  Eliminating the 
jury has been shown to reduce trial time by fifty percent.131  Thus, 
contractual jury waivers, like arbitration agreements, serve one of the main 
purposes of the justice system by making litigation more efficient.132 
By resolving disputes efficiently, contractual jury waivers also help 
the larger economy.  Parties that have more control over their disputes have 
a deeper satisfaction with the judicial process.133  Thus, they are more 
likely to enter into and rely on their agreements.  Courts that enforce 
parties’   legitimate expectations thus promote reliance and certainty in the 
marketplace.134  Further, the waivers avoid the costs of grossly excessive 
verdicts  granted  by  ‘runaway  juries.’135  Lastly, businesses that avoid these 
costs can reduce the charges that they pass on to consumers.136 
B. Georgia’s  and  California’s Interests in Barring Contractual Jury 
Waivers 
Georgia and California have an interest in barring contractual jury 
waivers.  Both of these states’  constitutions  require  that  the right to a jury 
be preserved “inviolate,”  and  both  Bank South and Grafton emphasized its 
importance.137  The right to a jury is firmly rooted in American history and 
jurisprudence.138  But, despite its importance, the Seventh Amendment has 
never been essential enough to the justice system to be incorporated into 
the Fourteenth Amendment and applied to the states.139 
Georgia and California also have an interest in protecting the right to a 
jury.140  But contractual jury waivers are most often used between 
 
 129 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 130 S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 3 (1924); H.R. REP. NO. 68-96 (1924), at 1–2  (“Arbitration  agreements  
are purely matters of contract, and the effect of the bill is simply to make the contracting party live up to 
his agreement[,] . . . reducing technicality, delay and expense to a minimum and at the same time 
safeguarding  the  rights  of  the  parties.”). 
 131 See Graham C. Lilly, The Decline of the American Jury, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 53, 57–58 
(2001). 
 132 See Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure 
Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461, 481–85 (2007). 
 133 See id. at 479–81. 
 134 Cf. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972). 
 135 See Lilly, supra note 131, at 56–57 n.12. 
 136 Cf. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594 (1991). 
 137 See supra Part I.F. 
 138 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 485–86 (1935).  See generally Elizabeth Thornburg, 
Designer Trials, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 181, 183–84 (discussing the importance and purposes of the civil 
jury in American history). 
 139 Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for the Jury 
Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 21–22 (2003). 
 140 See supra Part I.E. 
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sophisticated parties, such as in equipment leases and commercial loans.141  
These waivers are sometimes used in franchise or employee agreements, 
where there may be an imbalance of bargaining power.142  But courts have 
discretion to police agreements to prevent unfair bargaining, thus obviating 
the need for a complete bar on all contractual jury waivers.  Further, the 
knowing and voluntary standard applicable to such waivers is so strict that 
there is a “far  greater  likelihood  that  the  waiver  was  agreed  to  as  part  of  a  
mutually beneficial contractual arrangement and far less danger of 
overreaching  and  duress  by  the  party  seeking  to  enforce  the  waiver.”143 
III.  THE ERIE DOCTRINE: THE ‘UNGUIDED’ AND ‘GUIDED’ TESTS 
A. The  ‘Unguided’  Erie Test 
The Erie doctrine comes from the seminal U.S. Supreme Court 
decision, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.144  In Erie, the plaintiff sued a 
railroad in a federal diversity action for negligence after he was struck and 
injured by a train.145  The railroad defended that it owed him no duty of 
care as a trespasser under Pennsylvania common law.146  The court of 
appeals, however, affirmed   the   trial   court’s   ruling   that   the   railroad   owed  
him a duty of care under federal common law.147  The U.S. Supreme Court 
reversed and held that no duty existed because a federal court exercising its 
diversity jurisdiction must apply the substantive law of the state.148 
The Court looked to the Rules of Decision Act (RDA), which states: 
“The  laws  of  the  several  states,  except  where  the  Constitution  or  treaties  of  
the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be 
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United 
States,  in  cases  where  they  apply.”149  In Swift v. Tyson, the Court held that 
“the  laws  of  the  several  States”  referred  only  to  legislation,  and  thus  federal 
courts were free to develop their own common law.150  Erie overruled this 
interpretation and made federal courts bound by state common law as well 
as legislation.151  The Court said that the coexistence of federal and state 
common law after Swift caused litigants’  substantive  rights  to  be  enforced  
 
 141 See Zitter, supra note 1, at 53. 
 142 See Smith-Johnson Motor Corp. v. Hoffman Motors Corp., 411 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. Va. 1975) 
(franchise   agreement);;  Beach   v.  Burns   Int’l   Sec.   Servs., 593 A.2d 1285, 1286 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) 
(employment agreement). 
 143 L  &  R  Realty  v.  Conn.  Nat’l  Bank,  715  A.2d  748,  754–55 (Conn. 1998). 
 144 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 145 Id. at 69. 
 146 Id. at 69–70. 
 147 Id. at 70. 
 148 Id. at 72–73. 
 149 Id. at 71; 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000). 
 150 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18–19 (1842). 
 151 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78–79. 
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differently in state and federal court.152  This difference violated the Equal 
Protection Clause by encouraging non-citizens—who alone may remove a 
lawsuit to federal court—to  ‘forum-shop’  for  the  most  favorable  law.153 
Under Erie, federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the 
substantive law of the state.154  But these courts are independent and 
sovereign, having “strong  inherent  power” over matters of procedure155 and 
an   “interest   in   the   integrity   of   their   own   processes.”156  The distinction 
between  substance  and  procedure  is  “one  of  the  modern  cornerstones of our 
federalism, expressing policies that profoundly touch the allocation of 
judicial   power   between   the   state   and   federal   systems.”157  But the line 
between the two shifts, depending on the context.158  Federal courts must, 
therefore, carefully draw the line to avoid infringing on state sovereignty 
over substance or federal sovereignty over procedure. 
The unguided Erie test has three prongs.  First, a federal court is not 
required  to  follow  state  law  that  is  ‘procedural.’159  ‘Procedural’ rights are 
defined  as  “the  judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized 
by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for 
disregard or infraction of them.”160  ‘Substantive’   rights,   in   contrast,   are  
defined as those rights that, together with their corresponding duties, 
control  citizens’  “primary  private  activity”  in  everyday  life.161 
Second, even  state  law  that  is  ‘procedural’ must be applied if it would 
substantially affect the result of litigation.162  In Guaranty Trust Co. of New 
York v. York, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendant 
pursuant to the New York statute of limitations.163  The court of appeals 
reversed pursuant to a federal equitable practice of ignoring the state 
statute.164  The U.S. Supreme Court, reversing, held that the federal court 
must apply the state rule.165  The Court conceded that a statute of 
limitations may be classified as ‘procedural,’   but opined that Erie still 
requires that the outcome of litigation be substantially the same in both 
 
 152 Id. at 74–75. 
 153 See id. 
 154 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474–75 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 155 See id. at 472–73   (“Erie and its offspring cast no doubt on the long-recognized power of 
Congress to prescribe housekeeping rules for federal courts even though some of those rules will 
inevitably differ   from  comparable   state   rules.”);;   see also Erie, 304 U.S. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring) 
(“[N]o  one  doubts  federal  power  over  procedure.”). 
 156 Semtek  Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509 (2001). 
 157 See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 474 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 158 See id. at 471–72 (majority opinion). 
 159 See Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945). 
 160 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941). 
 161 See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 474–75 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 162 York, 326 U.S. at 109. 
 163 Id. at 100. 
 164 Id. at 100–01. 
 165 Id. at 110. 
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state and federal court.166  A federal court that enforced a state statute of 
limitations would, by barring recovery, “vitally”  affect  the  enforcement  of  
the  parties’  substantive rights in violation of Erie.167 
The Court gave unprecedented deference to state ‘procedural’  rules in 
the aftermath of York.168  The Court in Hanna v. Plumer, conceding that its 
deference in this period was too liberal, noted that, because even the most 
minor procedural difference can ultimately affect the outcome of a case, the 
York standard is not meant to be used as a  “talisman.”169  The other ‘aim’ of 
Erie, the Court explained, was to prevent forum-shopping.170  Thus, a court 
must consider both whether a difference between federal and state law 
would be outcome-determinative and whether this difference would 
substantially influence  a  litigant’s  choice  of  forum.171 
Third, state law, even if outcome-determinative, must not be applied if 
federal interests outweigh the state’s  interests.    In  Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural 
Electrical Cooperative, Inc., an injured electrical lineman sued his 
employer for negligence.172  The employer raised the affirmative defense 
that the plaintiff’s remedy was limited to the   worker’s   compensation  
statute.173  The South Carolina Supreme Court said that this statute required 
a judge to decide whether the plaintiff was a  statutory  ‘employee.’174  But 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that a jury must decide this factual issue.175  
The Court reasoned that the South Carolina court’s  rule  was not “bound  up  
with”  the  plaintiff’s substantive right to recover under the statute, but was 
only  a  “form  and  mode”  of  enforcing that right.176  The Court also said that, 
under the York standard, there  was  no  “certainty”  or  “strong  possibility”  of  
a different outcome if a jury decided the defense.177 
 
 166 Id. at 109. 
 167 Id. at 110. 
 168 See Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 534 (1949) (holding that state 
law controlled when an action is commenced for purposes of satisfying the statute of limitations); 
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 205 (1956) (holding that state law determined 
whether an arbitration agreement was enforceable). 
 169 380 U.S. 460, 466–67 (1965). 
 170 Id. at 467. 
 171 Id. at 468. 
 172 356 U.S. 525, 526 (1958). 
 173 Id. at 527. 
 174 Adams v. Davison-Paxon Co., 96 S.E.2d 566, 571 (S.C. 1957). 
 175 Byrd, 356 U.S. at 538. 
 176 Id. at 536. 
 177 Id. at 539–40.  The Court said: 
We have discussed the problem upon the assumption that the outcome of the litigation may 
be substantially affected by whether the issue of immunity is decided by a judge or a jury.  
But clearly there is not present here the certainty that a different result would follow . . . or 
even the strong possibility that this would be the case . . . . We do not think the likelihood 
of a different result is so strong as to require the federal practice of jury determination of 
disputed factual issues to yield to the state rule in the interest of uniformity of outcome. 
Id. 
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But the Court, retracting its post-York deference to state law, said that 
it would not apply the state rule even if it were outcome-determinative.178  
The Court reasoned that the Seventh Amendment commanded—or at least 
influenced—the federal custom of having a jury decide disputed issues of 
fact.179  The interest in preserving this practice, the Court said, was an 
“affirmative   countervailing   consideration”   that   outweighed   the   state’s 
interest in ensuring substantial uniformity of outcome.180 
B. The  ‘Guided’  Erie Test 
The alternative, ‘guided’  Erie test comes from Hanna v. Plumer.181  In 
Hanna,   the   court   of   appeals   affirmed   the   district   court’s   dismissal   of   a  
personal injury suit on grounds that the manner of service of process was 
insufficient.182  Massachusetts law required personal service of process, but 
service was instead made to   an   individual   at   the   defendant’s   residence,  
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1).183  The U.S. Supreme 
Court reversed and held that service was adequate.184  The Court said, in 
dicta, that the York outcome-determinative test would probably not require 
application of the state rule governing service of process.185 
The Court went on to   say,   however,   that   an   ‘unguided’ Erie test is 
inappropriate for a Federal Rule.186  The Court observed that the U.S. 
Constitution grants Congress the power to fashion rules of procedure for 
the federal courts.187  Congress, by the Rules Enabling Act (REA), 
delegated authority to the Court to promulgate rules   of   “practice   and  
procedure”  for   the   federal  courts that do  not  “abridge,  enlarge,  or  modify  
any   substantive   right.”188  Thus, a Federal Rule controls if it satisfies the 
requirements of the REA and the U.S. Constitution.189  A Federal Rule 
passes   muster   under   the   REA   as   long   as   it   is   “rationally   capable of 
classification”190 as   procedural   and   does   not   “abridge,   enlarge,   or  modify  
any  substantive  right.”191  The Court found that Rule 4(d)(1) satisfied these 
requirements and thus controlled the manner of service of process.192 
 
 178 Id. at 537–38. 
 179 Id. at 537. 
 180 Id. at 537–38. 
 181 See 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). 
 182 Id. at 462–63. 
 183 Id. at 461–62. 
 184 Id. at 474. 
 185 Id. at 466. 
 186 Id. at 471. 
 187 Id. at 472. 
 188 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958). 
 189 See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471. 
 190 Id. at 472. 
 191 Id. at 464 (quoting Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958)). 
 192 Id. at 474. 
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IV.  THE ERIE DOCTRINE REQUIRES FEDERAL COURTS TO APPLY FEDERAL 
LAW ON CONTRACTUAL JURY WAIVERS 
A. The Erie Doctrine Applies because there is a Federal-State Conflict 
As a preliminary matter, there is a conflict between Georgia and 
California law on contractual jury waivers and federal law.  In Stewart 
Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., a copy machine dealer filed suit against 
a manufacturer under a dealership agreement.193  The defendant moved to 
transfer the case under 28 U.S.C. section 1404, pursuant to a forum 
selection clause in the agreement.194  The motion was denied because 
Alabama law barred such clauses.195  The U.S. Supreme Court, reversing, 
found that there was a direct Erie conflict between federal and state law.196  
The Court reasoned that the statute allows a federal court to consider a 
forum selection clause as a factor in deciding whether to transfer the case, 
but the Alabama rule did not allow the court to consider the clause at all.197 
Under the reasoning in Ricoh, federal law on contractual jury waivers 
is in direct conflict with Georgia and California law.  As the venue statute 
at issue in Ricoh allows a court to consider various factors in determining 
whether to transfer the case, federal law on contractual jury waivers allows 
a federal court to consider various factors in determining whether the 
parties are entitled to a jury.  In contrast, as the Alabama rule prohibited 
consideration of the forum selection clause in Ricoh, Georgia and 
California law prohibit any consideration of the contractual waiver. 
B. The  Supreme  Court’s  Erie Decision, Simler v. Conner, Controls 
In Simler v. Conner, the Supreme Court commanded that, in an Erie 
context,  “the  right  to  a  jury  trial  in  the  federal  courts  is  to  be  determined  as  
a matter of  federal  law.”198  The command is clear that federal law governs 
all Seventh Amendment issues in federal courts.  Therefore, Simler 
requires a federal court sitting in diversity to apply federal law to determine 
whether the Seventh Amendment right may be waived.  Thus, federal 
courts routinely rely on the Simler rule in applying the knowing and 
voluntary standard rather than conflicting state law.199 
One federal court in Texas refused to follow Georgia law under Bank 
South in determining whether a contractual jury waiver is enforceable.  In 
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RDO Financial Services v. Powell, the plaintiff sought to enforce a jury 
trial waiver in a guaranty agreement.200  The defendant argued that, under 
the persuasive authority of Bank South, the waiver was unconstitutional.201  
But the court applied federal law in holding that the waiver was not 
knowing and voluntary.202  The court reasoned that, although Simler’s  
precise holding concerned whether a claim is characterized as legal or 
equitable, federal courts have “routinely”   applied   the knowing and 
voluntary standard to contractual jury waivers.203 
The same court later refused to follow California law under Grafton in 
determining whether a contractual jury waiver is enforceable.  In 
TransFirst Holdings, Inc. v. Phillips, the defendant employees argued that, 
under Grafton, the plaintiff employer could not enforce a jury waiver 
provision in an employment agreement providing that California law 
governed.204  The court disagreed and held that the waiver was knowing 
and voluntary under federal law.205  The court reasoned that, under Simler 
and its earlier decision in Powell, “[t]he right to a jury trial in a federal 
court is clearly a question of federal law.”206 
Only one federal court has followed state law in determining whether 
a contractual jury waiver is enforceable.  In IFC Credit Corp. v. United 
Business and Industrial Federal Credit Union, the Seventh Circuit held that 
Illinois law controlled the enforceability of a contractual jury waiver in an 
equipment lease.207  The court reasoned: 
Simler holds  that  the  classification  of  a  dispute  as  “legal”  or  “equitable”  must be 
made under federal norms . . . . It does not follow that national law also controls 
the validity of a contractual agreement to a bench trial.  There is no general 
federal law of contracts after Erie R.R. v. Tompkins;;  if  ‘federal  law’  did  control,  
the best it could do would be to use state law as the rule of decision.208 
This reasoning is unsound for three reasons.  First, the  court’s reading 
of Simler is too narrow.  Federal law must also control the enforceability of 
contractual jury waivers because the exercise of the Seventh Amendment 
must, under Simler, be uniform.  Second, while federal courts cannot make 
generally applicable contract law, they may fashion rules to determine 
whether rights under federal statutes may be waived.209  Thus, the knowing 
and voluntary standard may determine whether the Seventh Amendment 
right to a jury trial may be waived.  Third, “state law may be incorporated 
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as the federal rule of decision”   only   “when there is little need for a 
nationally uniform body of law.”210  The need to ensure uniformity in 
Seventh Amendment law, therefore, precludes incorporation of state law. 
C. Even if Simler did not Control, the Federal Arbitration Act would 
Control under  a  ‘Guided’  Erie Test 
Under  a  ‘guided  Erie test, federal courts must apply a federal statute 
that is broad enough to cover the issue and that is a valid exercise of 
Congress’s power under the U.S. Constitution to regulate procedure for the 
federal courts.211  The FAA satisfies both prongs of this test and thus 
requires federal courts to enforce contractual jury waivers. 
First, the FAA is broad enough to cover the issue.  A contractual jury 
waiver is an implicit part of an arbitration agreement.212  State laws that bar 
contractual jury waivers would, therefore, bar arbitration agreements as 
well.213  Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has used the FAA to preempt state 
laws restricting contractual jury waivers.  For example, in Southland Corp. 
v. Keating, the California Supreme Court held that an arbitration clause in a 
franchise agreement was unenforceable under the California Franchise 
Investment Law, which prohibited waiver of the rights therein.214  The 
court reasoned that the arbitration agreement waived the statutory right to a 
jury.215  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the California law 
was void under the Supremacy Clause.216  If the FAA preempts state laws 
that bar contractual jury waivers in state courts, it surely must control over 
state laws that bar these waivers in federal court. 
Second, the FAA is a valid exercise of congressional power to 
regulate procedure.  Although Southland and its progeny gave the FAA a 
substantive dimension, Congress enacted the FAA pursuant to its 
constitutional power to regulate federal procedure.217  The FAA also does 
not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive rights.218 
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D. Even if the Federal Arbitration Act did not Control, the ‘Unguided’ 
Erie Test would still Require Application of Federal Law 
1. Federal Law on Contractual Jury Waivers is Procedural 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electrical 
Cooperative said that whether a judge or a jury decided factual issues 
relevant to an affirmative defense in a negligence case was not “bound  up” 
with   the   parties’   substantive rights   but   only   a   “form   and   mode” of 
enforcing them.219  Thus, under Byrd, whether a judge or jury decides 
factual issues relevant to claims in a contract dispute is not “bound up” 
with  the  parties’  substantive  rights  under  the  agreement  but  is only a “form 
and mode” of enforcing them. 
The   Court’s   definition   of   ‘procedure’   supports   this   conclusion.  
Substantive rights govern   the   parties’   primary   activity   under   a contract, 
including mutual promises, performances, and remedies for breach.  
Procedural rights, on the other hand, govern the judicial process by which 
those rights are enforced.220  The right to a jury is procedural because it 
concerns who determines which party is entitled to a remedy.  This right 
does not become substantive simply because it is part of the agreement—“a  
contract about procedure remains a matter of procedure.”221 
A ‘procedural’  rule  is “bound  up” with substantive rights only when a 
state declares an  “integral”   relationship  between   the two.222  Georgia and 
California have not, by judicial decision or statute, suggested that the 
parties’  rights  under  an  agreement  would  be  affected  if  a judge, rather than 
a jury, determined the factual issues under an agreement.  Thus, there is no 
integral relationship between Georgia and California law on contractual 
jury waivers and  the  parties’  rights  under  substantive  law. 
2. Federal Law on Contractual Jury Waivers is not Outcome-
Determinative 
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electrical 
Cooperative that whether a judge or jury decides factual issues relevant to 
claims in a negligence case would not substantially affect the outcome of 
the litigation.223  Whether a judge or jury decides factual issues relevant to 
the   parties’   claims   in   a   contract   dispute   will   also, therefore, not 
substantially affect the outcome of the litigation.  The   Court’s   Erie 
jurisprudence on arbitration agreements supports this conclusion. 
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In Wilko v. Swan, a purchaser of securities brought suit for 
misrepresentation under the Securities Act of 1933.224  The district court 
held that an arbitration agreement was unenforceable because the Securities 
Act provided a special right of recovery in a judicial forum.225  The Court 
agreed, holding that the arbitration agreement would deprive the plaintiff of 
its remedy under the Act.226  The Court reasoned that the choice of forum 
was a substantial right under the Act, because its protections applied much 
less in an arbitral forum.227  The Court noted that arbitrators are not 
instructed in the law, and review of their decisions is limited.228 
The Court maintained this view in its post-York period of deference to 
state law.  In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, the district court 
denied   the   employer’s   motion   to   enforce   an   arbitration   clause in the 
employment agreement because Vermont law made arbitration agreements 
revocable.229  The court of appeals reversed, reasoning  that  “[a]rbitration  is  
merely  a  form  of  trial,”  and  thus enforcing the arbitration agreement would 
not  infringe  on  the  parties’  substantive  rights.230  The U.S. Supreme Court 
reversed because New York law may have governed it instead.231  But the 
Court   also   disagreed   with   the   court   of   appeals’   classification   of   an  
arbitration agreement as a mere procedural matter: 
If the federal court allows arbitration where the state court would disallow it, the 
outcome of litigation might depend on the courthouse where the suit is brought.  
For the remedy by arbitration, whatever its merits or shortcomings, substantially 
affects the cause of action created by the State.  The nature of the tribunal where 
suits are tried is an important part of the parcel of rights behind a cause of action.  
The change from a court of law to an arbitration panel may make a radical 
difference in ultimate result.232 
The Court explained that arbitration offers fewer procedural 
protections than trial.233  For example, arbitration offers no right to trial by 
jury under the Seventh Amendment; arbitrators are not instructed in the 
law; the record of their proceedings is not as complete; and judicial review 
of their decisions is limited.234 
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,235 the 
Court abrogated its previous view in Wilko and Bernhardt.  Mitsubishi 
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involved an antitrust dispute over an international contract between an 
automobile manufacturer and distributor.236  The Court affirmed the district 
court’s   grant   of  Mitsubishi’s   motion   to   enforce an arbitration agreement 
and ruled that claims under federal antitrust statutes are arbitrable.237  The 
Court reasoned: “By  agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not 
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their 
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”238 
In Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., the Court 
squarely rejected its view in Wilko and Bernhardt.239  In Rodriguez, 
securities investors brought suit against a brokerage firm for violations of 
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934.240  The district 
court held that, under Wilko,  the  investors’ claims under the Securities Act 
were not arbitrable.241  The court of appeals reversed.242  The U.S. Supreme 
Court affirmed.243  The Court admitted that its view that arbitration would 
substantially affect the outcome of litigation was outmoded and pervaded 
by  “the  old  judicial hostility to arbitration.”244 
According to Wilko and Bernhardt, arbitration has many differences 
from a bench trial, including the right to trial by jury.  But under Mitsubishi 
and Rodriquez, these differences do not substantially affect the outcome of 
litigation.  A jury trial, on the other hand, has only one procedural 
difference from a bench trial, the right to a jury.  Under these decisions, 
therefore, federal law on contractual jury waivers is even less outcome-
determinative than federal law on arbitration agreements. 
One may argue that federal law on contractual jury waivers, even if 
not outcome-determinative, will influence litigants to remove to federal 
court to enforce them.  But a rule that does not substantially influence the 
outcome is unlikely to substantially influence the choice of forum.245  And 
even a rule that causes forum-shopping does not violate Erie if it is not 
outcome-determinative.  Justice Harlan, concurring in Hanna v. Plumer, 
explains why too  much  reliance  on  either  ‘aim’  of  Erie is wrong: 
The Court   is   quite   right   in   stating   that   the   “outcome-determinative”   test   of  
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, if taken literally, proves too much, for any rule, no 
matter  how  clearly  “procedural,”  can  affect  the  outcome  of  litigation  if  it   is  not  
obeyed.  In turning from   the   “outcome”   test   of   York   back   to   the   unadorned  
forum-shopping rationale of Erie, however, the Court falls prey to like 
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oversimplification, for a simple-forum shopping rule also proves too much; 
litigants often choose a federal forum merely to obtain what they consider the 
advantages of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or to try their cases before a 
supposedly more favorable judge.246 
Mitsubishi and Rodriquez show that federal law on contractual jury 
waivers is not outcome-determinative.  Thus, any risk of forum-shopping 
caused by such waivers is chimerical.  But, even if federal law did cause 
forum-shopping, it still would not violate Erie,   under   Justice   Harlan’s  
reasoning, without creating substantial differences in outcome. 
3. Even if Federal Law on Contractual Jury Waivers was Outcome-
Determinative, Federal Interests would Control. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently said that the federal interest 
in uniformity of the exercise of the Seventh Amendment is paramount.  For 
example, in Simler v. Conner, the Court commanded that federal law 
govern the right to a jury to ensure its uniform exercise as “demanded  by  
the  Seventh  Amendment.”247  Also, in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electrical 
Cooperative, the Court said that the federal interest in whether a judge or 
jury determined factual issues was   “countervailing”   because   of   “the  
influence—if not the command—of the Seventh Amendment.”248  Thus, 
federal law governs whether the Seventh Amendment may be waived to 
ensure uniformity in its exercise. 
Federal courts follow this reasoning in enforcing contractual jury 
waivers.  For example, in Phoenix Leasing v. Sure Broadcasting, Inc., the 
plaintiff lender moved to enforce a jury waiver in a loan agreement against 
the borrower.249  The defendant argued that the waiver was unconscionable 
under California law, while the plaintiff argued that the knowing and 
voluntary standard controlled the waiver’s   validity.250  The court avoided 
the Erie question by finding no direct conflict between federal and state 
law.251  But the court said, in dicta, that, if there were a conflict, “the  
validity of contractual waivers of . . . [t]he right to a jury trial in federal 
court is governed by federal law” under Simler252 because of “[t]he  need  to  
ensure the uniformity of exercise of the Seventh Amendment  right.”253 
Federal interests in enforcing agreements that allow parties to resolve 
their disputes efficiently are also paramount.  In Stewart Organization v. 
Ricoh Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court held that federal law determined 
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whether a forum selection clause was enforceable in federal court.254  
Justice Kennedy, concurring, stated: 
The federal judicial system has a strong interest . . . not only to spare litigants 
unnecessary costs but also to relieve courts of time-consuming pretrial motions.  
Courts should announce and encourage rules that support private parties who 
negotiate such clauses.  Though state policies should be weighed in the balance, 
the authority and prerogative of the federal courts to determine the issue . . . 
should be exercised so that a valid forum-selection clause is given controlling 
weight in all but the most exceptional cases.255 
Contractual jury waivers support the same interests as forum selection 
clauses because both agreements reduce the expense and delay of litigation.  
Thus, under   Justice   Kennedy’s   reasoning,   federal interests in enforcing 
contractual jury waivers control over  Georgia’s  and  California’s  interests  in  
barring them, unless the most exceptional case applies. 
This is not an exceptional case, for three reasons.  First, federal law 
provides extraordinary protection for the right to a jury.  The knowing and 
voluntary standard is so much stricter than the contract law applied to other 
pre-dispute agreements that a criminal defendant may waive his or her most 
basic constitutional rights under it.256  Even the Grafton court admired the 
extraordinary protection that this standard provides and seemed to suggest 
that the California Legislature adopt it.257  This   standard’s   extraordinary 
strictness virtually guarantees that a waiver is fairly bargained for.258 
Second, the protection that federal law provides for the right to a jury 
is more than adequate.  As Congress stated in the legislative history to the 
FAA, “The  constitutional  right  to  a  jury  trial  is  adequately  safeguarded”  by 
arbitration agreements.259  If ordinary contract law applicable to such 
agreements provides adequate protection when the parties may not even 
realize that they are waiving the right to a jury, the knowing and voluntary 
standard must provide more than adequate protection when the waiver is 
conspicuous and freely bargained for. 
Third, federal law provides better protection for the right to a jury than 
Georgia and California law.  Georgia and California law encourage parties 
that wish to waive the right to a jury to turn to arbitration agreements 
instead.  The contract law applicable to such agreements provides minimal 
protection for this right.  The knowing and voluntary standard, on the other 
hand, stems the tide to arbitration and more than adequately protects this 
right.  Thus, federal courts can best protect the right to a jury by continuing 
to enforce contractual jury waivers under federal law. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Comment proposes that the Erie doctrine requires federal courts 
sitting in diversity in Georgia and California to continue to enforce 
contractual jury waivers under federal law.  The Erie doctrine applies 
because federal courts enforce these waivers, while the supreme courts of 
Georgia and California have barred them.  In Simler v. Conner, the U.S. 
Supreme Court commanded that federal law governs the Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial.  Thus, federal courts must continue to 
enforce contractual jury waivers if they were knowing and voluntary. 
Alternatively, this Comment proposes that the FAA also requires 
federal courts to enforce these waivers, because it satisfies both prongs of 
the  ‘guided’  Erie test.  First, the FAA is broad enough to cover the issue by 
making arbitration agreements enforceable, because contractual jury 
waivers are implicit parts of such agreements.  The FAA must conflict with 
state laws restricting contractual jury waivers in federal court because it 
preempts such laws in state courts.  Second, the FAA is a valid exercise of 
congressional power to regulate procedure in the federal courts. 
This Comment further proposes that federal common law controls 
because,  under  the  Court’s  Erie jurisprudence, it satisfies the three prongs 
of the ‘unguided’  Erie test.  First, whether a judge or jury determines a 
dispute is a matter of procedure.  Second, federal law would not 
substantially affect the outcome of the litigation, especially if arbitration 
agreements do not.  Third, even if federal law were outcome-determinative, 
federal interests in enforcing agreements that resolve disputes efficiently 
outweigh state interests, absent the most exceptional case.  This is not an 
exceptional case where Georgia’s   and  California’s interests in protecting 
the right to a jury control, because the   ‘knowing  and  voluntary’   standard 
more than adequately protects those interests. 
Two legal developments must occur as a result of this thesis.  First, 
the Ninth Circuit has granted review to a California district court’s ruling 
that contractual jury waivers are enforceable under federal law, despite 
Grafton.260  If the Ninth Circuit reverses, the U.S. Supreme Court should 
grant certiorari and reverse the Ninth Circuit decision.  Second, the Georgia 
and California legislatures should overturn Bank South and Grafton by 
making these enforceable with appropriate safeguards.  Georgia and 
California must not curtail the freedom to enter into agreements that serve 
important public interests.  In an era of customized litigation, the view that 
some rights are too sacred to be bargained for is a thing of the past. 
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